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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NEW
PENAL LAWS OF NEW YORK AND MICHIGAN
B. J. GEORGE, JR.*
F imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then the drafters of the New
York Penal Law should feel flattered, at least by those responsible for pre-
paring the proposed Michigan Criminal Code.1 A comparison of the New York
statute with the Michigan draft shows substantial similarities in approach, or-
ganization and technical terminology, a fact regularly acknowledged in the com-
mentaries to the Michigan provisions.
There is in fact historical precedent for this. Much early Michigan legisla-
tion in the 1840's and 1850's was adapted from the then-new New York codes,
and New York decisions were relied on in interpreting the new legislation. But
the principal reasons for relying on the New York revision were first, that it
is the most sophisticated legislation yet achieved in the evolution of a twentieth
century criminal code, and second, the aims and goals it embodied were ap-
pealing to the Michigan revisers. Both points deserve some amplification.
I. THE NE-w YORK PENAL LAW AS A MODEL
The present decade is seeing a wave of criminal law reform; Professor
Israel calls this "clearly 'the' law reform movement of the sixties."2 Thirty or
more states have either completed and enacted new substantive criminal codes
or are at some stage of the revision process.3 Some of the earlier efforts, like
those in Louisiana4 and Wisconsin, 5 proceeded principally without outside il-
lustration or example. From the early 1950's through 1962, however, the work
of the American Law Institute in drafting the Model Penal Code offered both
a spur to action and a source of ideas. As the work of the Institute progressed,
the measure of its influence increased accordingly. The drafters of the Wisconsin
code noted the Institute's program, 7 the Minnesota revisers acknowledged their
indebtedness to the early phases of the Institute's efforts,8 and the Illinois com-
mittee quoted extensively from the Institute's tentative drafts in the commen-
* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan. Associate Director, Practising Law Institute;
Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University.
1. Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code (September 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Michigan Draft]. Information about availability of copies can be obtained from The State
Bar of Michigan, Lansing, Michigan.
2. Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform-A Look at the Proposed Michigan Re-
vised Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 772, 773 (1968).
3. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 126 (Report by the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967).
4. Louisiana State Law Institute, Projit (1942).
5. State of Wisconsin in Assembly, Bill No. 100, A. (1953), enacted as ch. 696, Wis.
Laws of 1955 [hereinafter cited as Wisc. Bill No. 100, A.].
6. Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited M.P.C.].
7. Wisc. Bill No. 100, A., Introduction at ii.
8. Proposed Minnesota Criminal Code 5 (West Publishing Co. 1962). See also Pirsig,
Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 417, 421 (1963).
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tary to its proposed revision.9 It is, however, the New York revision that serves
both as an endorsement of and a critical reaction to the Model Penal Code.
This use of the Code is of course what the Institute contemplated, as the
usage of "model code" rather than "uniform code" clearly indicates.10 But this
"model" function has its limitations. For one thing, the composition of the
Institute, representing as it does lawyers, judges and teachers from every juris-
diction, precludes close attention to the details of criminal law administration
in a particular jurisdiction. Therefore, the practical suitability of each provision
to a particular state's legal system is not something that can adequately be
dealt with at Institute meetings, for reasons of time if no other. Additionally,
the generalist orientation of the Institute membership makes it a matter of
chance only that questions reflecting current practice and enforcement needs
are put to the reporters. While preliminary colloquia offer some opportunity for
criticism, they do not necessarily affect the text finally submitted to and adopted
by the Institute itself. Whatever the reasons, there is considerable justification
for some of the practice-oriented criticisms levied against the Model Penal
Code."
The New York revision effort, therefore, constitutes the first deliberate,
well-funded and amply staffed evaluation of the Model Penal Code. The degree
of its actual influence is discussed later in this symposium by those responsible
for the New York revision; they have acknowledged elsewhere that the Code
"has been an invaluable source of stimulation And guidance throughout the
course of the Commission's work."'1 2 A carefully drawn statute like the New York
Penal Law, written in a state with a long history of continuous law revision,
could not under any circumstances be ignored by a legislative draftsman in
another state who wished to perform his task conscientiously.
Something more, however, was necessary if a Michigan adaptation of the
New York re-evaluation of the Model Penal Code was to begin. It was necessary
that there be factors of similarity of environment and consonance of goals. The
environmental factor is either there or not there. A code suitable for New
York, with its great concentrations of population in cities and thickly settled
rural areas contains many provisions totally beyond the experience and needs
of a sparsely-populated state, the economy of which rests largely on farming,
ranching or extractive industries. Michigan, however, though smaller in total
population, offers a mix of urban and rural dwellers, manufacturing and farm
industries, not too dissimilar to New York. Therefore, most of the problems
9. Proposed Illinois Revised Criminal Code of 1961 (Tentative Final Draft 1960),
passim.
10. See Wechsler, Foreword to Symopsinm on the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 589 (1963).
11. Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 608, 618-30
(1963).
12. Proposed New York Penal Law (Edward Thompson Co. ed. 1964), Comm'n fore-
word at VI [hereinafter cited as Prop. Pen. Law].
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the New York legislature had to deal with in a modern penal code confronted
Michigan legislators as well.
Most of the consonance, however, stemmed from the shared objectives of
the revision efforts in the two states, what one might call agreement in draft-
ing objectives. The chief objectives in both jurisdictions were modernization of
code coverage, improvement in code organization, simplification of statutory
language, and completion of statutory coverage in both general conceptual
provisions and specific definitions of crime. Though other objectives also could
be achieved in Michigan that had already been substantially achieved in New
York, like abolition of common-law crimes' 3 and the removal of essentially
regulatory statutes from the criminal code, 14 it was the more fundamental
shared goals that made the New York revision so attractive to the Michigan
revisers.
Modernization of code coverage. The New York revisers faced a statute
that had not been substantially reworked for eighty years. 15 The Michigan
committee confronted a similarly outmoded statute. Though in form a new
code had been enacted in 1931, it constituted little more than a rearrangement
of the then-existing statutes, many of them going back to the original Michigan
Penal Code of 1846. The original code had been almost buried in the legislative
accretions that enfolded it, and the chronic failure to evaluate new legislative
proposals in light of existing statutes meant that a great many outmoded
statutes, governing things like inciting Indians to break treaties with the United
States,' 6 dueling' 7 or using the name of a former president to promote liquor
sales,' 8 lingered on far beyond their time, while cumulative sections dealt with
essentially the same undesirable conduct. As illustrations of the latter, over
seventy different sections cover destruction of or injury to property,' 9 sixteen
govern larceny20 and thirteen deal with embezzlement. 21 A painstaking survey
of all the compiled laws showed over 3500 sections either defining crimes or
specifying criminal penalties. Though not all of these could be replaced by or
incorporated in revised criminal code provisions without inconvenience or im-
pairment of effective enforcement,22 nearly 2,000 of them could be replaced by
the approximately 350 sections of a revision without any diminution in effective
coverage. The history of New York law revision showed that this goal could
13. See Israel, supra note 2 at 799-801.
14. E.g., Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.557 (1968) (contracts in restraint of trade); §§
752.251-752.257 (regulation of liquid fuels and lubricating oils).
15. Prop. Pen. Law, Comm'n foreword at V.
'16. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.348 (1968).
17. Id., §§ 750.171-750.173.
18. Id., § 750.42.
19. Michigan Draft, commentary to § 2707.
20. Id., commentary to § 3208 at 226-27.
21. Id. at 228-29.
22. For example, the motor vehicle code, election law, liquor law and tax statutes were
left untouched except to recommend substitution of penalty categories for existing punish-
ments.
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be effectively realized. At the same time, the welter of legislation left some
modern problems either without coverage or with ineffective controls. This,
however, constituted a goal in itself, to be discussed below.23
Improvement in code organization. The original Michigan Penal Code was
topically arranged, though only basic in coverage. Degrees of crime were not
utilized except for murder. Probably because of the large number of individual
sections enacted over the decades that did not fit easily within the original
scheme, and because the goal of the legislature in 1931 was compilation and
not codification, a changeover was made to an alphabetical arrangement of
crimes by title. If this was designed to promote ease of access, then the rear-
rangement accomplished no more than a good index might have. No classifier
ever escapes the need for a miscellaneous category,24 but an alphabetical ar-
rangement very quickly creates problems in assigning highly specific provisions.
A good indexer lists all the variations in subject and title he can think of in
an effort to out-guess all the future users of his index. But assignment of a
statutory section to a category can be made only once. Therefore, the result
is an often frustrating search for an applicable provision, and in some instances
a failure to discover a section relevant to the particular case; this phenomenon
seems an inevitable result of an alphabetical classification system
2 6
Therefore, the Michigan revisers quickly resolved to follow the New York
drafters in returning to a topical arrangement, in which the specific definitions
of crime fall into the nine major categories of offenses involving danger to the
person, offenses involving damage to or intrusion upon property, offenses in-
volving theft and related activity, forgery and fraudulent practices, offenses
against public administration, offenses against public order, offenses against
public health and morals, offenses against the family and miscellaneous offenses.
This does not mean that problems of allocation do not exist. Robbery of course
involves danger to the person, and it might be lodged in that category rather
than that of offenses related to theft. The close relationship it bears to theft,
however, coupled with the cross-use of definitions from the theft chapter, caused
the Michigan drafters, like their New York predecessors, to place robbery after
theft (larceny). Abortion can be classified as a homicide-related offense or
as conduct essentially affecting the family, depending on which aspect of the
problem one prefers to emphasize. The New York drafters chose the homicide
context; the Michigan drafters followed the Model Penal Code 20 by placing
abortion with family-related crimes. On the whole, however, a topical arrange-
23. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
24. Not even the Michigan Draft lacks such a category. Ch. 75 covers miscellaneous
offenses.
25. See Israel, supra note 2 at 785-86; Kuh, supra note 11 at 608-09. An unparalleled
achievement is Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.110b (1968) (dumping garbage, etc. from boats),
which was classified with breaking and entering (ch. XVI); a clerk's careless finger probably
prevented it from being where it belongs, in ch. XV on boats and navigation.
26. MPC § 230.3.
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ment coupled with a good index promotes efficient use of the code, so that the
use of that format early prevailed in the Michigan committee.
The Michigan committee also borrowed another aspect of New York legis-
lative practice that had required no reconsideration by the New York drafters,
i.e., the division of crimes into degrees. Though on the basis of intrinsic defini-
tion or judicial fiat some offenses came to be viewed as lesser included offenses
in relation to more serious crimes, there has been no easy way by which this
interrelationship can be ascertained. The Michigan committee thought it saw
in the New York tradition and in the history of the Michigan first- and second-
degree murder statutes several advantages in a degree format. The comparative
gravity of criminal conduct, at least in the eyes of the legislature, is clearly
indicated through a degree format. In contrast with a "simple-aggravated"
dichotomy, a greater degree of refinement in functional distinctions can be
achieved through multiple degrees. Many pleading problems are removed, par-
ticularly in connection with joinder of alternative counts. The possibility of a
variance between pleading and proof is reduced if not eliminated; the plea-
bargaining process is also enhanced. Although the Michigan draft does not al-
ways divide into degrees when the New York statute does, on the whole there
is a great similarity that is not accidental.
Simplification of statutory language. Much inherited statutory language
is totally unacceptable as a guide to conduct. Its repetitiveness and verbosity
are explainable for several reasons. One is the attitude of lawyer and lay legis-
lators alike that a statute is not really a statute unless it is filled with "suches,"
"aforesaids" and "whereases," a phenomenon that also appears in deed and
contract drafting. Another is the counterpart to the "survival of the marginal
pleading," in which the atrocious is recognized as void without litigation, the
commendable is acknowledged as valid without attack, and only borderline
language subjeced to protracted litigation. If a complicated or convoluted plead-
ing is reluctantly sustained as operative, it is then copied because it is the only
one that has received the judicial imprimatur, no matter how gingerly given.
The same thing can be true of a statute. The most obvious instance of this is
the Michigan verbatim enactment 27 of the Roth28 test, even though later ex-
planations by the Supreme Court 29 probably render this language out of date.
A third is a specific legislative reaction to a prior judicial decision, in which
the statutory language is aimed at one narrow point but no other. To make its
purpose clear, the legislature uses elaborate language that makes the legislation
very narrow in coverage. Much of the proliferation of larceny and embezzle-
ment legislation mentioned earlier has this as its underlying cause. A fourth
27. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.343b (1968).
28. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
29. See Stanley v. Georgia, - U.S. - (1969); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502
(1966); Ginzburg v. New York, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); A Book Named "John Clelands
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); cf. Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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is a misplaced sense of legislative delicacy, typified by the "definition" of
sodomy as "the abominable and detestable crime against nature"30 that smacks
even more of vagueness than the vagrancy statutes struck down in recent
years.31 Whatever the reasons, inherited statutory language is usually difficult
for a lawyer and impossible for an average layman to understand.
The physical organization of individual sections also hinders comprehen-
sion, in that complicated definitions, often including definitions of definitions,
are woven into a single sentence or paragraph, to the point that only the most
skilled sentence diagramer might be able to dissect the verbiage and glean its
meaning.
There is also usually no consistency in term usage, particularly with re-
gard to those terms that define mental condition for criminality. "Wilful,"
"wanton," "malice," "purpose" and "intent" are used indiscriminately without
definition and without pattern, with the result that judicial construction of
the intent element of crime is often as hopelessly confused as the legislative
usage.
The Michigan draft follows the lead of the New York revision, and in
some instances carries it further,3 2 by simplifying the code language in three
ways. First, it looks for terms in ordinary usage to replace traditional circum-
locutions. For example, sexual intercourse is called exactly that, and deviate
sexual intercourse is defined as an act of sexual gratification involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. 33 Some segments of
the community may prefer not to talk about the subject at all or use euphem-
isms, but the statutory meaning and usage should be clear. Second, it places
all definitions either in a special definitional section at the beginning of a chap-
ter, if the terms defined appear in several sections, or as a subsection if the
term is not used outside the particular section. Though each word in a fairly
simple definition of a crime may be further defined elsewhere, and even though
a word in one definition may be elaborated on in yet another provision, there
is an easy transition from the simple to the complex that should promote under-
standing of the legislative purpose and standardization of jury instructions.
Third, the provisions on culpability, or mental state,34 comprehend only four
terms, "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly" and "with criminal negligence,"
each of which is defined. In each substantive section the choice of culpability
element is deliberate, and usage remains constant throughout the code. The
30. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.198 (1968).
31. E.g., Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967); Parker v. Municipal
Judge, 427 P.2d 642 (Nev. 1967); Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282
N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
32. Compare N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 155.00-155.05 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. Pen. Law] with Michigan Draft §§ 3201-3208. See infra notes 59-61 and accompany-
ing text.
33. Compare Michigan Draft § 2301 with N.Y. Pen. Law § 130.20.
34. Compare Michigan Draft § 305 with N.Y. Pen. Law § 15.05.
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end product is a statute much easier to understand and administer than present
law.
Completion of statutory coverage. Despite the welter of statute law in
Michigan, there are serious omissions in coverage the draft code is designed to
remedy. One of the principal defects in the present Michigan compilation is
its failure to set out what continental European codes call the "general part,"
which normally includes the exposition of territorial and temporal applicability,
as well as the requirements of criminality, culpability, justification and the de-
fenses which modify the individual definitions of crime in the "special part."
Michigan case law on important matters like causation and mistake is frag-
mentary or lacking, yet judges still must instruct juries on these points. Though
New York has long covered some of these problems in its Penal Law, the new
Penal Law and the Model Penal Code together provide an augmentation of the
sketchy provisions of an earlier era, and serve as the pattern on which the
Michigan revision was based.
A second problem of coverage lay in the failure of all the statutes together
to touch on problems that trouble a modern urban community. As examples,
the Michigan false pretenses statute35 does not include "promissory fraud,"
even though that is a common means of committing fraud. A number of persons
might be defrauded of small amounts cumulating to a considerable sum, but
the maximum penalty the criminals face under the present statutes is concurrent
jail terms or fines on misdemeanor counts. Even an offense as obvious as riot
has not until late 1962 been specifically covered by a substantive statute.36
Nor does Michigan have a true extortion statute.37 A careful study of the present
law shows a number of serious omissions in coverage that leave citizens without
the protection they deserve. Therefore, with the New York revision as a starting
point, these and other problems were covered by the proposed Code.3 8
In summary, in terms of maturation of drafting process, congruence of
environment and shared objectives, the New York revision offered to the Michi-
gan drafters an excellent model that in a majority of instances became the
adopted pattern. There were, however, several points on which there is major
divergence between the two revisions. On occasion this was because of a need
for legislation felt in one state but not in the other. Part of the explanation,
35. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.218 (1968). See People v. Widmayer, 265 Mich. 547,
251 N.W. 540 (1933); People v. Reynolds, 71 Mich. 343, 38 N.W. 923 (1888).
36. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 750.521-750.528 (.1968) is, in effect, the English Riot Act
of 1714, which does not define the crime, but provides for dispersion of rioters. See R.
Perkins, Criminal Law 348-49 (1957). Mich. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 752.541-752.545 (1968) in
effect enacts the thrust of the Michigan draft.
37. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.213 (1968) covers only certain threats made with in-
tent to extort money or a pecuniary advantage. See Michigan Draft at 247-48, commentary
to §§ 3245-3247.
38. E.g., Michigan Draft §§ 3201 (1) (definition of "threat"); 3201 (m) (definition of
"value" permitting cumulation); 3245-3247 (extortion). See also Israel note 2, supra at
805-13.
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however, lies in the difference in the drafting process itself, a matter to which
we turn briefly.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE DRAFTING STRUCTURE
Code revisions may be undertaken at the instance of the legislature itself,
or as a project by a bar association, particularly in a state having an integrated
bar. More often than not, the legislature itself has been the initiating agency,
in form at least, and has resolved that either a special joint committee, a spe-
cial commission or a permanent law revision commission is to prepare a bill for
later legislative consideration. New York fits the majority pattern, and was
able to assign the task of drafting a revised penal law to a comparatively well-
funded commission able to make long-term personnel appointments. Under this
drafting structure, the primary scrutiny of proposals came from within the
commission and the legislature itself; other organizations expressed themselves
through hearings and communications to the commission.
The Michigan procedure, like that of Texas,3 has been entirely different.
The Michigan Supreme Court indicated to the commissioners of the integrated
State Bar of Michigan the desirability of a revision of the criminal law, crim-
inal procedure, and statutes affecting mentally-ill offenders; the commissioners
thereupon approved the creation of a special Committee to Revise the Criminal
Code, the members of which were drawn from both state bar rolls and non-
legal specialties like law enforcement, correctional administration and the
clergy. Shortly after the committee was formed, members of the regular com-
mittee on criminal jurisprudence of the State Bar asked to join in the work
of revision, so that mailings of drafts were made to about 150 lawyers and non-
lawyers. Funds provided by the State Bar itself went little beyond providing
meeting rooms and printing costs, and the non-involvement at that time of
the legislature meant that no funds were (or have been) appropriated to sup-
port the drafting process. Therefore, the commissioners had to turn to the law
schools of the state, particularly the University of Michigan Law School, for
the necessary subsidy. This subsidy was achieved first by designating two crim-
inal law specialists40 as reporters, and then by providing them with released
time and research assistance from funds available to them as faculty members.
Assistance of this sort is not unusual,41 and is probably indispensable if no
39. See Keeton & Reid, Proposed Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 Texas L. Rev.
399 (1967).
40. The author served as reporter on Chapters 1, 3, 6, 7, 12-15, 20-23, 26-28, 32-33,
40-42, 55-57, 60-62, 70, 75 and 99 of the Michigan Draft. Professor Jerold H. Israel was
reporter on Chapters 4, 10, 45-50 and 63. For the criminal procedure draft under prepara-
tion, Professor Edward M. Wise of Wayne State University Law School has also been desig-
nated a reporter.
41. Cf. California Joint Legislative Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code,
Penal Code Revision Project Report 7-11 (1967); Pirsig, supra note 8; Bill No. 100, A.,
Introduction ii.
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legislative support is forthcoming,42 since few state bar budgets are ample
enough to underwrite two or three years salary for a high-priced specialist.
However, a code prepared exclusively by law teachers is likely to be of
limited practical utility even if it is reasonably literate and conceptually com-
plete. Therefore, the reporters submitted preliminary drafts to the large com-
mittee, and on occasion to a smaller, so-called "drafting committee" for their
criticism and suggestions. Both were abundantly given, and the reporters sub-
mitted from three to seven drafts of each chapter before final committee ap-
proval was given. The fate of a number of tentative draft -provisions drawn
directly from the Proposed New York Penal Law, or at later stages from the new
Penal Law itself, suggests that terms and coverage which the New York Re-
vision Commission and legislature found acceptable or desirable were rejected
somewhat summarily by a cross-section of Michigan professionals. Moreover,
in many instances the rejection or alteration was not the product of different
needs or historical background, but of the differences between the drafting
mechanisms themselves. In any event, an appraisal of compared code provi-
sions alone, without some consideration of drafting procedures, may well lead
to distorted conclusions.
Whatever the reason, the Michigan draft duplicates the New York Penal
Law in many respects. Within the scope of this article, however, a consideration
of the differences is perhaps more productive than a listing of similarities.
III. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES
An idea of the extent of the similarity between the two codes can best
be gained by a close examination of sections side by side. I prefer, however, to
illustrate differences in terms of the reasons for their existence, and not their
substantive content.
"Try-again" provisions. There is fairly general agreement among specialists
that some traditional crimes, particularly those relating to sexual conduct and
preservation of the traditional family structure, are either ineffective or pro-
ductive of incidental effects like blackmail or forced divorce, marriage or sepa-
ration, and are, if anything, worse than the traditional evil aimed at. Therefore
most modern drafts at some stage of their generation have tried to exempt
from coverage adultery, seduction, private gambling and consensual adult homo-
sexuality, and to reduce the scope of incest to siblings, ascendants and.descend-
ants, and of abortion to non-therapeutic abortion. Since, however, legislators
are notoriously more conservative about or fearful of these topics than many
lawyers and judges who see the effect of the older provisions, the fate of these
innovations has been unfortunate. In New York, the provision on abortion
was conservative to begin with, and the legislature required the addition of
provisions on consensual sodomy 43 and adultery4 to the final version. Only in
42. Id.
43. N.Y. Pen. Law § 130.38.
44. Id., § 255.17.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Illinois was there any breakthrough; a comparison of the proposal with the
final Illinois statute suggests that relaxed homosexuality provisions were the
bargain for a continued tight abortion law.45
Despite this, the Michigan committee, though not without dissent, decided
to place before the Michigan legislature and citizens a code similar to the ones
rejected in other states, by eliminating criminality for adultery, seduction and
adult consensual homosexuality 4 6 and by urging a fairly broad exception in
favor of therapeutic and eugenic abortion. When the draft was released, the
news media of course seized on this as a topic of discussion, practically to the
exclusion of what are far more significant provisions, functionally speaking, in
other segments of the code. They continue to be major foci of criticism 4 The
fact that six states48 have since enacted therapeutic abortion statutes and that
a bill for that purpose was pending in the 1968 and 1969 legislative sessions
has brought some muting of the attack on the abortion provisions, but there
is no guarantee that Michigan will join the minority group with therapeutic
abortion laws. The fate of the other efforts to bring professed mores into line
with those practiced is in the balance; meanwhile, the Michigan draft stands
as still another challenge to inherited verbal traditions of morality.
Abolition of death penalty. Much of the emotionalism affecting substantive
criminal law focuses on administration of the death penalty, if it has not been
abolished. Michigan for over a century has not provided for the death penalty
except in cases of treason, and in 1963 prohibited that penalty by constitution.
49
Perhaps as a result, the disputes in the Michigan committee over homicide
coverage revolved principally about whether the equivalent to voluntary man-
slaughter at common law should be retained, if so whether it should constitute
second-degree murder or manslaughter, and whether there should be two de-
grees of manslaughter. Though committee members felt strongly about these
issues, the reasons were a fondness for traditional common-law terminology and
a distrust of too wide a choice of alternatives in jury deliberations, and not the
stated or unstated belief that the death penalty should be encouraged or dis-
couraged. The want of this highly-charged issue also meant that fairly severe
limitations on the felony-murder doctrine were accepted without demur.
Absence of the death penalty also materially affected the Michigan ap-
proach to mental disease or defect. The issue of mental condition relieving the
actor of criminal responsibility is most likely to arise in prosecutions for crimes
45. 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 23-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (abortion) ; see committee com-
ments to §§ 11-2, 11-3 of the Proposed Illinois Revised Criminal Code (Tentative Final
Draft 1960).
46. See Michigan Draft, commentary to §§ 2305, 7010.
47. E.g., Comment, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 934 (1968).
48. California: Health & Safety Code §§ 25950-25954; Penal Code §§ 274-276. Colo-
rado: Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-2-50--40-2-53 (Supp. 1967); Georgia: H.B. 281, adding Ga.
Stat. Ann. § 26-1106 (1968). North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967) ; Mary-
land: Md. Ann. Stat. ch. 470, art. 43, §§ 145, 149E-G (1968); Oregon: - Stat. -;
England has also liberalized its law in the Abortion Act of 1967, 1967 ch. 87.
49. Mich. Const., art. 4, § 46 (1963).
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of violence, and is almost a certainty in murder prosecutions if the death penalty
may be invoked. As a result, in a capital penalty state, debates about the in-
sanity defense very often cloak a dispute over whether or not evidence of
mental condition should be available if the result is jury refusal to authorize
punishment of death. Whatever the explanation, the New York provision" is
hardly a radical extension of the insanity defense.
In a state like Michigan, however, the determination of criminal guilt or
of mental condition excluding responsibility is important only in selecting a
place of confinement, since convicts are dealt with by the Department of Cor-
rections, while persons adjudicated to be "criminally insane" are the province
of the Department of Mental Health. As a result, relatively little committee
attention was focused on the definition of mental condition as such; the exist-
ence in early Michigan cases 5 ' of fairly broad definitions of mental illness
excusing responsibility certainly made the very broad draft code definition
52
far more acceptable than it might have been in a state firmly committed to the
M'Naghten Rule. Instead, the concern was over early or unsupervised release
of those acquitted of crime and committed to mental health facilities. This
concern, however, cuts two ways, because due process shortcomings of the civil
commitment and release procedures suggest that as many inmates may be
held too long as are released prematurely. In any event, a consideration of the
mental health problem within a procedural framework is preferable to a debate
about the insanity defense with the death penalty as the backdrop.
Differing local policies. Michigan and New York each have their own prob-
lems, their own local needs and attitudes that must be taken account of in
examining differences between the two revisions.
Perhaps the most noticeable difference in treatment is in the theft (larceny)
area. Experience under the existing Michigan law has shown that the traditional
three-way distinction between larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses, an
historically explainable division, creates many problems of pleading and proof;
in a reaction to many abortive prosecutions terminating in a finding that what
was charged as larceny was actually embezzlement, or some other combination
of the possibilities, Michigan law in effect makes an allegation of one of them
an allegation of the other two as well.54 The Michigan statute thus attempts a
procedural solution of what intrinsically is a problem of substantive law drafting.
50. N.Y. Pen. Law § 30.05.
51. People v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509, 512, 66 N.W. 379 (1896); People v. Durfee, 62
Mich. 487, 493, 29 N.W. 109 (1886).
52. Michigan Draft § 705 provides:
A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time he acts, as a
result of mental disease or defect, he lacks capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
53. See George, Due Process in Protective Activities, 8 Santa Clara Law. 133, 134-44
(1968).
54. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 767.60 (1968).
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A comparison of the New York larceny sectionr 5 with the Illinois 0 and
Indiana57 provisions led the Michigan committee to believe that the New York
approach was less well suited to a reform of Michigan law than the Illinois and
Indiana examples. In particular, the New York provision lumps together an
expanded definition of larceny that comprehends common-law larceny, embezzle-
ment and obtaining by false pretenses, with larceny based on acquisition of lost
property, false promises not within the concept of false pretenses, and extortion.
The sorting-out of the specific concepts is managed principally in the degree
sections.58 In rejecting this approach, the Michigan draft makes use of a much
broader list of definitions in the first section of the chapter, 0 a definition of
theft relatively short in compass, 60 three degrees of theft incorporating most
of the basic New York structure,' 1 completely separate extortion sections, 2
and specialized statutes on problems like appropriation of lost property, 5 theft
of services, 4 and failure to make proper disposition of funds received or held.05
The net coverage of the two codes may not differ substantially, but the funda-
mental approach to drafting is different.
There were instances in which the Michigan committee thought the New
York revision failed to take into account practical problems of administration.
For example, the New York first-degree robbery section 0 aggravates the penalty
if the defendant is armed with a deadly weapon. The experience of Michigan
law enforcement officers, however, is that it is very often difficult to prove that
the actor was in fact in possession of a deadly weapon as defined 7 unless he
actually used it or was immediately apprehended with the weapon in his pos-
session. The present Michigan legislation punishes the use of anything appear-
ing to be a deadly weapon as heavily as if it were a weapon. 8 This, however,
is too sweeping, and in effect encourages the actor to be armed because he is
under no threat of greater punishment if he is in fact armed rather than armed
in appearance only. The Michigan choice, therefore, was to change what might
be called the strict liability features of the present Michigan statute into a
prima facie evidence provision based on appearances, thus reaching what is
hopefully a more satisfactory solution to the law enforcement problem than
the New York provision achieved. A difference in enforcement policy also under-
55. N.Y. Pen. Law § 155.05.
56. Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, art. 16 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
57. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3030 (Burns 1964).
58. N.Y. Pen. Law 9§ 155.25-155.40.
59. Michigan Draft § 3201.
60. Id. § 3205.
61. Id. §§ 3206-3208.
62. Id. §§ 3245-3247.
63. Id. § 3215.
64. Id. § 3220.
65. Id. § 3225.
f6. N.Y. Pen. Law § 160.15.
67. Id. § 10.00(12).
68. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.529 (1968).
69. Michigan Draft § 3305(2).
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lies the Michigan rejection of claim of right as a defense to robbery,70 a position
apparently rejected in the New York statute.
71
Sometimes procedural traditions account for differences in drafting tech-
nique. Under the New York statute, affirmative defenses are used which the
defendant must establish by a preponderance. 72 In Michigan, however, the pro-
fession traditionally abhors the idea of an affirmative defense, and the case law
in general requires the prosecution to disprove matters like self-defense.73 While
in one instance of a completely new justification or excuse in the code, the
committee accepted an affirmative defense in the technical sense,74 in general it
refused to change the Michigan tradition. On the other hand, however, many
definitions designed to limit an otherwise too broad definition of criminality
would be generally unenforceable if the prosecution had to disprove the exist-
ence of the exceptions as a part of its case in chief. Therefore, the committee
devised the concept of "burden of injecting the issue," which requires the de-
fendant to "offer some competent evidence relating to all matters subject to
the burden," but which then requires the state to disprove the existence of
those matters beyond a reasonable doubt.
75
Occasionally the Michigan committee felt the New York draft failed to
touch on a matter deserving coverage. A prime example is the want of a defini-
tion of causation. Though the case law on the question is not abundant, the
cases that have arisen have produced such divergent results that some definitive
statement ought to be made; in addition, juries often must be instructed about
causation. Therefore, the Michigan draft followed the example of the Model
Penal Code76 by including a causation provision.77 The committee also thought
there was merit in restating legislatively the New York case law78 permitting
the cumulation of small amounts taken pursuant to a scheme to enhance penal-
ties.70 The New York revisers may have intended to change this law; the
Michigan committee thought the idea had merit as a means of protecting neigh-
borhoods against petty consumer fraud schemes, so that it should be specifically
incorporated.
Some of the discrepancies turn on the characterization of a problem as
substantive or procedural. Michigan has taken the position, shared with other
70. Id. § 3310.
71. Cf. N. Y. Pen. Law §§ 155.16(1), 160.00.
72. The term is defined in N.Y. Pen. Law § 25.00(2).
73. See, e.g., People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111 N.W.2d 742 (1961); People v.
Robinson, 228 Mich. 64, 199 N.W. 622 (1924).
74. Michigan Draft § 2005(4) (defense to vicarious responsibility for felony murder).
75. The concept is defined in Michigan Draft § 135(n). Examples are §§ 645 (burden
of injecting issues of justification), 720 (burden of injecting issues of culpability), 1010(2)
(renunciation of criminal purpose in criminal solicitation), 2005(2) (homicide under extreme
mental or emotional disturbance), 2330 (mistake as to consent in sexual offense), 3240(1)
(claim of right in theft), 7015(3) (therapeutic abortion).
76. M.P.C. § 2.03.
77. Michigan Draft § 320.
78. People v. Cox, 286 N.Y. 137, 36 N.E.2d 84 (1941).
79. Michigan Draft § 3201(m).
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domestic 0 and foreign 8 ' codes, that matters of jurisdiction (territorial applic-
ability of the substantive penal law) and venue (choice of forum) should be
dealt with in the substantive code,82 that the statute of limitations is more a
matter of substance than procedure, 3 and that an expanded statutory form of
double jeopardy should be set out.8 4 The New York revisers took a more re-
stricted view of the scope of a penal law, but have since proposed coverage of
these matters in a revised criminal procedure law.85
It is in the area of sentencing, however, that the most obvious differences
in policy appear. This deserves independent examination.
IV. A CoMPAmsoN oF SENTENCING STRUCTURES
In many respects the Michigan draft adopts the same sentencing system as
the New York revision. There are, however, a number of important differences
that make the Michigan proposal perhaps more progressive or modern than
New York's. Whether the Michigan legislature will be as liberal-minded as the
Michigan drafters remains to be seen. At any rate, some comparison of the
sentencing structures is in order.
First, the Michigan draft accepts the basic judgment of the New York
revisers and Model Penal Code that there should be classes of felonies and mis-
demeanors uniform throughout the code and assigned rationally to each offense.
However, it embodies fewer felony categories and somewhat lower penalties than
the New York statute. Michigan has three felony categories 0 in comparison
with New York's five,87 and four sub-felony categories 8 in comparison with
New York's three.8 9 This tends to shift the classification scheme somewhat
downward on the scale. Furthermore, Michigan sets its maxima somewhat lower
than New York,90 and provides a life imprisonment possibility only for first-
degree murder.91
80. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 1-5, 1-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
81. E.g., Danish Criminal Code art. 7; German Penal Code § 3, Norwegian Penal
Code § 12. See also J. Andenaes, The General Part of the Criminal Law of Norway 318-21
(Ogle trans. 1965); F. Feldbrugge, Soviet Criminal Law: The General Part 67-69 (Vol. 9,
Law in Eastern Europe, .1964); George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation,
64 Mich. L. Rev. 609 (1966).
82. Michigan Draft §§ 140, 145.
83. Id. § 130.
84. Id. §§ 151-154.
85. Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 10, 15, 20, comm'n staff notes
(Edward Thompson Co. ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Prop. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law].
86. Michigan Draft § 1201(1).
87. N.Y. Pen. Law § 55.05(1).
88. Michigan Draft § 1201(2), (3).
89. N.Y. Pen. Law § 55.05(2).
90. The maxima under Michigan Draft §1401 and N.Y. Pen. Law § 70.00 are:
Michigan New York
Class A 20 years life imprisonment
Class B 10 years 25 years
Class C 5 years 15 years
Class D - 7 years
Class E 4 years
91. Michigan Draft § 2005(5), authorizing a term of from 10 years to life. The ten-
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The Michigan and New York revisions also differ materially on minimum
sentences. New York permits the court to fix a minimum sentence if it does not
exceed a third of the maximum.P2 The present Michigan statute permits the
judge to set a minimum as high as he wishes; release earlier than that time is
possible only if the judge approves a request by parole authorities to that
effect.03 Data available to the Michigan committee suggested that some judges
set high minima which they thereafter refuse to modify, and that this has been
productive of uncurable disparity. The committee, therefore, took the position
that except in the case of first-degree murder 4 there should be no minimum
sentences, and that commitment should be to the Department of Corrections
for up to the statutory maximum.9 5 To guarantee somewhat against arbitrary
parole procedures that could prove as productive of disparity as arbitrary sen-
tencing practices, the committee provided minimum due process through a set
of required parole procedures.9 6 Michigan thus moved toward the California
concept of sentence and release, and away from the New York system.
Third, the Michigan code contains no recidivist statutes like those in present
Michigan law9 7 and the New York revision.98 The explanation in part is one
of usage. The change some years ago from a mandatory to a discretionary re-
peated offender law caused the Michigan statute to fall practically into disuse.
Very few commitments as habitual offenders have been ordered in the past
decade, and the parole board has tended to release habitual offender prisoners
on exactly the same basis as other prisoners not so committed. In only a handful
of cases did the judicial specification of an augmented term enable the Depart-
ment of Corrections to retain in custody a person whom they viewed to be
clearly dangerous. The recommendations of the committee's corrections experts
were that the recidivism statutes be repealed, and that clear provision be made
for the post-imprisonment civil commitment of convicted felons who on the
basis of mental condition and institutional record were highly dangerous. The
draft code would accomplish the first; 9 9 other legislation facilitates the secoid.100
In a similar vein, the almost completely unused "sexually delinquent person"
statute decreeing indeterminate incarceration up to life for certain sexual of-
year minimum was projected from present experience under Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.316
(1968) ; though the statute calls for life imprisonment in solitary confinement at bard labor,
first-degree cases are reviewed after about 15 years, and a great many prisoners released
on parole after commutation of sentence.
92. N.Y. Pen. Laws 70.00(3).
93. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 791.233(b) (1968).
94. Michigan Draft § 2005(5), see supra note 91.
95. Michigan Draft § 1401(3).
96. Id. § 1410. The section in fact restates present parole practice developed adminis-
tratively by the Department of Corrections.
97. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 769.8-769.13 (1968).
98. N.Y. Pen. Law § 70.10.
99. See Michigan Draft, commentary to § 1401 at p. 131.
100. Mich. PubI. Acts 306 (1968), adding Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 791.268 (1968).
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fenses' 01 would be abolished;102 the recent repeal of the Michigan criminal sex-
ual psychopath law" 3 suggests that the Michigan legislature will not find this
proposal unacceptable.
Fourth, the Michigan proposal makes extensive use of a diagnostic com-
mitment to the Department of Corrections, the Department of Mental Health, or
both serially,'104 in order to promote an intelligent choice between conditional
release and imprisonment, the only choice open to the sentencing judge under
the draft. This rests on favorable experience under the counterpart federal
statutes,0 5 an analogous procedure if competence to stand trial is at issue,10
and the availability of Department of Corrections facilities for diagnosis; it goes
further than the New York procedural proposals. °7
Fifth, the Michigan draft encourages a transition from criminal proceed-
ings to civil commitment proceedings if a diagnostic commitment reveals a
mental condition warranting non-penal custody. 10 8 The committee rejected an
earlier companion provision calling for dismissal of the prosecution under those
circumstances, but this option is in fact available to any judge who might in-
voke the section. This formal approval of a procedural retracking does not
seem to appear in any other new code.
Sixth, the Michigan draft embodies a National Council on Crime and De-
linquency model statuteP°9 authorizing any person sentenced to probation or
conditional or unconditional discharge"10 to request annulment of his conviction
if he behaves himself for a specific period of time. The statute expands upon
as well as restates a Michigan statute"' extending this possibility to convicted
minors. This, too, seems to go beyond most state statutes, including New
York's.
Seventh, the Michigan committee found the Model Penal Code approach
to fines and costs more congenial than New York's. Therefore, it requires the
sentencing judge not only to determine that the defendant has gained money
or property through his crime,1 12 but that he is able to pay the fine without
101. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 750.10(a) (1968) defines the concept, and § 767.61(a)
covers the required pleading. The specific authorization is found in the punishment pro-
visions of specific crimes, e.g., §§ 750.520 (carnal knowledge), 750.338 (gross indecency be-
tween males), 750.338b (gross indecency between females), 750.338b (gross indecency be-
tween male and female).
102. See Michigan Draft, commentary to § 1405.
103. Mich. Publ. Acts 143 (1968); the statute adds § 330.35(b) to govern the parole
or release of those already committed under the statute, which was Mich. Comp. L. Ann.
§§ 780.501-780.509 (1968).
104. Michigan Draft § 1220.
105. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(b) (Supp. 1968).
106. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 767.27a, 767.27c (1968).
,107. Prop. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 200.30 (1968).
108. Michigan Draft § 1225.
109. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Annulment of a Conviction
of Crime Act (1962); cf. Cal. Pen. Code. § 1203.4.
110. Found in Michigan Draft §§ 1315-1335; the New York counterpart provisions
are N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 65.00-65.20.
111. Mich. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 780.621-780.622 (1968).
112. Michigan Draft § 1501(2), corresponding to N.Y. Pen. Law § 80.00.
248
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
impairing reparation to the victim of his act or otherwise suffering an unfair
burden." 3 A similar limitation applies to costs," 4 a matter apparently left un-
touched by either of the New York statutes. Moreover, nonpayment of fine or
costs is not to work what is in effect an extension of the prison term that the
legislature thought should be the maximum for the particular offense, the gen-
eral practice under existing laws.115 If a defendant proves unable to pay, the
amount should be reduced or remitted,zl 6 but even a contumacious defendant
is not to have his prison term as such extended. Instead, enforcement is in the
nature of a civil contempt of a judicial order, with a time limitation placed on
the maximum period of civil commitment."1
7
A comparison of the two statutes, therefore, shows that in many respects
the Michigan drafters have tried to experiment with dispositional alternatives
far more than the New York revisers. Whether their experimentation is feasible
turns on the legislative treatment of the Michigan code.
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the differences between the New York revision and the Michigan
draft, the New York statute very greatly influenced the text of the Michigan
proposal. The fact that so many policies and so much statutory language sur-
vived the critical scrutiny of experts in another state attests in a significant way
the wisdom of the New York revision commission and of the legislature that
accepted its work.
The fate of the Michigan revision is uncertain at this writing. Because of
the long calendar of bills in the 1968 legislative session, it was not possible to
print the Michigan revision in time to meet the deadlines for bill submission
set by the two houses of the legislature. As it turned out, this may have been
fortunate, for in the aftermath to the Detroit riots of July, 1967, the atmos-
phere was unfavorable to a calm appraisal of a sweeping revision of the criminal
law, particularly one designed to increase flexibility in sentencing. The draft
was introduced in the 1969 legislative session, and a number of hearings held
on it. In addition to transfer of the abprtion provisions to a separate bill,
adultery and consensual homosexual provisions were added, and the justification
for use of deadly force by police officers considerably expanded. Although the
governor and attorney-general expressed themselves favorably, the chief justice
campaigned actively against it. Because of the pendency of several other con-
troversial and politically more pressing bills, the draft was tabled for considera-
113. Michigan Draft § 1510.
114. Id., § 1525 (3).
115. Prop. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 215.10(3) would also prohibit extending the maxi-
mum period authorized because of nonpayment of a fine, and otherwise imposes specific
limits on the amount of extension within the statutory maximum.
116. Michigan Draft §§ 1510(3) (fine), 1525(4) (costs); cf. Prop. N.Y. Crim. Proc.
Law § 215.30.
117. Michigan Draft § 1535.
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tion in 1970, with additional committee hearings scheduled in the interim. In
changing provisions, New York provisions are frequently looked to for guidance.
If the proposed Michigan Criminal Code does become the new criminal law of
Michigan, the New York Penal Law will have played an important role in its
creation.
